

**EXHIBIT A**

**BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.**  
Sarah N. Westcot (State Bar No. 264916)  
701 Brickell Avenue, Suite 2100  
Miami, FL 33131  
Telephone: (305) 330-5512  
E-mail: [swestcot@bursor.com](mailto:swestcot@bursor.com)

*Counsel for Plaintiff*

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

V.R., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Case No. 5:24-cv-07399-EJD

Plaintiff,

**FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION  
COMPLAINT**

LINKEDIN CORPORATION,

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

**Defendant.**

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### **Deleted:**

**FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT – JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**  
**CASE NO. 5:24-CV-07399-EJD**

1 Plaintiff V.R. (“Plaintiff”) brings this class action complaint on behalf of herself and all  
 2 other persons similarly situated (the “Class Members”) against Defendant LinkedIn Corporation  
 3 (“LinkedIn” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff brings this action based on personal knowledge of the facts  
 4 pertaining to herself, and on information and belief as to all other matters, by and through the  
 5 investigation of undersigned counsel.

6 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

7 1. Plaintiff brings this suit on behalf of all LinkedIn users who live in the United States  
 8 and who scheduled an urgent care medical appointment through the website [www.citymd.com](http://www.citymd.com) (the  
 9 “Website”). The Website is owned and operated by Village Practice Management Company, LLC  
 10 d/b/a CityMD (“CityMD”).

11 2. Patients trust healthcare providers to safeguard their information. Moreover, such  
 12 information is protected by state and federal law. When booking medical appointments online,  
 13 Patients reasonably expect the sensitive and legally protected information related to their  
 14 appointment will remain confidential and protected from third parties. Being able to trust that their  
 15 health information is secure is essential to upholding patient rights and the integrity of our  
 16 healthcare system.

17 3. Health information is incredibly valuable to online advertising companies. Despite  
 18 the legal protections afforded to this sensitive information, advertising companies go to great  
 19 lengths to intercept such information to use in their targeted advertising campaigns.

20 4. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff and members of the putative class, LinkedIn intentionally  
 21 intercepted these sensitive and confidential communications, including the location and time of  
 22 their appointment, their gender, and the type of appointment they were seeking treatment for (*see*  
 23 Figures 2–5). LinkedIn failed to receive consent for these interceptions, and thereby engaged in  
 24 conduct that expressly contravened its own terms and representations.

25 5. LinkedIn develops, owns, and operates “the world’s largest professional network  
 26 with more than 1 billion members in more than 200 countries and territories worldwide.”<sup>1</sup>

27  
 28 <sup>1</sup> LINKEDIN, ABOUT, [https://about.linkedin.com/?trk=homepage-basic\\_directory\\_aboutUrl](https://about.linkedin.com/?trk=homepage-basic_directory_aboutUrl).

LinkedIn is also an advertising company that touts its ability to deliver targeted marketing to specific users.

3           6. Defendant intercepted this confidential information for target advertising purposes.  
4 Plaintiff brings this action for legal and equitable remedies resulting from these illegal acts.

## **PARTIES**

6       7. Plaintiff V.R. is domiciled in Brooklyn, New York. Plaintiff maintained an active  
7 LinkedIn account at all relevant times when booking a medical appointment on the Website. When  
8 Plaintiff created her LinkedIn account she agreed to LinkedIn's User Agreement, which provides  
9 that "You and LinkedIn agree that the laws of the State of California, U.S.A....shall exclusively  
10 govern any dispute relating to this Contract and/or the Services."<sup>2</sup> LinkedIn's "Services," includes  
11 those related to its software code known as the LinkedIn Insight Tag.<sup>3</sup>

12       8. In or around August 9, 2024, Plaintiff scheduled a medical appointment through the  
13 Website. When booking her appointment, Plaintiff selected a CityMD location, a time, who she  
14 was booking an appointment for, and why she was booking the appointment. Unbeknownst to  
15 Plaintiff, LinkedIn was tracking her private activity on CityMD's Website using the LinkedIn  
16 Insight Tag. LinkedIn used this software to track Plaintiff and intercept her communications with  
17 CityMD, including communications that contained confidential information related to her medical  
18 appointment. LinkedIn never received consent from Plaintiff or received permission to track or  
19 sell her data to advertisers. LinkedIn's acts and practices, as described herein, are an egregious  
20 breach of Plaintiff's privacy.

21       9.      Defendant LinkedIn Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal place  
22 of business located in Sunnyvale, California. Defendant LinkedIn at all times knew that the  
23 incorporation of its software onto the CityMD Website would result in its interception of  
24 confidential medical information. Defendant LinkedIn, as the creator of its software and the  
25 LinkedIn Insight Tag, knew that it intercepted users' interactions on the Website that incorporated  
26 its technology. Defendant LinkedIn is well aware of the dangers of incorporating such technology.

<sup>2</sup> LINKEDIN, USER AGREEMENT, <https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement#dispute>

3 Id.

on websites that offer medical and health services but continues to do so. LinkedIn intends to intercept this protected and sensitive health data due to the value it holds for targeted advertising purposes. LinkedIn's User Agreement and Privacy Policy both fail to inform LinkedIn account holders that LinkedIn may acquire their confidential medical information when they interact with healthcare providers or covered entity websites and applications. LinkedIn does not obtain consent from its account holders prior to intercepting their confidential medical information nor does it reject or delete confidential medical information that it intercepts through the LinkedIn Insight Tag. Instead, LinkedIn incorporates this data into its advertising machinery for its own independent purposes.

#### JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A), as amended by the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), because this case is a class action where the aggregate claims of all members of the proposed class are in excess of \$5,000,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs, there are 100 members of the putative class, and Plaintiff, as well as most members of the proposed class, are citizens of different states than Defendant.

11. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant resides in California, Plaintiff submits to the jurisdiction of the Court, and because Defendant, at all times relevant hereto, has systematically and continually conducted, and continues to conduct, business in California.

12. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, this Court is the proper venue for this action because Defendant conducts business in this District and throughout the State of California and its principal place of business is in this District.

#### FACTUAL BACKGROUND

##### A. **Background of the California Information Privacy Act (“CIPA”)**

13. The CIPA prohibits “any person” from “willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication … read[ing], or attempt[ing] to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state; or who uses, or

1 attempts to use, in any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information  
2 so obtained, or who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to  
3 unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned[.]” § 631(a).

4       14. To establish liability under California Penal Code Section 631(a), a plaintiff need  
5 only establish that the defendant, “by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any  
6 other manner,” does any of the following:

7           Intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether physically,  
8 electrically, acoustically, inductively or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone  
9 wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or instrument of any  
internal telephonic communication system,

10          *Or*

11          Willfully and without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any  
12 unauthorized manner, reads or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning  
13 of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over  
any wire, line or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state,

14          *Or*

15          Aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons to unlawfully do,  
or permit, or cause to be done any of the acts or things mentioned above in this section.

16       15. Section 631(a)’s applicability is not limited to phone lines, but also applies to “new  
17 technologies” such as computers, the internet, and email. *See Matera v. Google Inc.*, 2016 WL  
18 8200619, at \*21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (the CIPA applies to “new technologies” and must be  
20 construed broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose of protecting privacy); *Bradley v. Google, Inc.*,  
21 2006 WL 3798134, at \*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006) (the CIPA governs “electronic  
22 communications”); *In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litigation*, 956 F.3d 589, 607–08 (9th  
23 Cir. 2020) (reversing dismissal of CIPA and common law privacy claims based on Facebook’s  
24 collection of consumers’ internet browsing history).

25       16. Plaintiff and Class Members may seek injunctive relief and statutory damages of  
\$5,000 per violation under the CIPA. Cal. Penal Code § 637.2.  
27  
28

1           **B. LinkedIn's Platform and Business Tools**

2       17. LinkedIn markets itself as “the world’s largest professional network on the  
 3 internet[.]”<sup>4</sup> But LinkedIn is no longer simply a tool to help users find jobs or expand their  
 4 professional network. LinkedIn has moved into the marketing and advertising space and boasts of  
 5 its ability to allow potential advertisers to “[r]each 1 billion+ professionals around the world” via  
 6 its Marketing Solutions services.<sup>5</sup> Recently, LinkedIn was projected as being responsible for  
 7 “roughly 0.9 percent of the global ad revenue” which included approximately \$5.91 billion in  
 8 advertising revenue in 2022.<sup>6</sup>

9       18. According to LinkedIn, “[t]argeting is a foundational element of running a  
 10 successful advertising campaign — [g]etting your targeting right leads to higher engagement, and  
 11 ultimately, higher conversion rates.”<sup>7</sup> Targeting refers to ensuring that advertisements are targeted  
 12 to, and appear in front of, the target demographic for an advertisement. To that end, LinkedIn’s  
 13 Marketing Solutions services allow potential advertisers to “[b]uild strategic campaigns” targeting  
 14 specific users.<sup>8</sup> LinkedIn’s “marketing solutions allow advertisers to select specific characteristics  
 15 to help them reach their ideal audience. The ads [users] see on LinkedIn are then targeted to  
 16 provide content relevant to [the users].”<sup>9</sup>

17       19. As a result of its activities and operation of the LinkedIn Insight Tag, LinkedIn is  
 18 able to make extremely personal inferences about individuals’ demographics, intent, behavior,  
 19 engagement, interests, buying decisions, and more.<sup>10</sup>

20  
 21       <sup>4</sup> LINKEDIN, WHAT IS LINKEDIN AND HOW CAN I USE IT?,  
 https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/a548441#.

22       <sup>5</sup> LINKEDIN, MARKETING SOLUTIONS, https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions.

23       <sup>6</sup> Valentina Dencheva, *LinkedIn annual ad revenue 2017-2027*, STATISTA (Dec. 12, 2023),  
 https://www.statista.com/statistics/275933/linkedins-advertising-revenue.

24       <sup>7</sup> LINKEDIN, REACH YOUR AUDIENCE: TARGETING ON LINKEDIN, p.3,  
 https://business.linkedin.com/content/dam/me/business/en-us/marketing-  
 solutions/resources/pdfs/linkedin-targeting-playbook-v3.pdf.

25       <sup>8</sup> LINKEDIN, *supra* note 5.

26       <sup>9</sup> LINKEDIN, LINKEDIN ADS AND MARKETING SOLUTIONS,  
 https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/a421454.

27       <sup>10</sup> See LINKEDIN, MARKETING SOLUTIONS, https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-  
 solutions/audience (“Target audiences through demographic marketing[,]” “Zero in on intent,

1       20. The personal information and communications obtained by LinkedIn are used to  
 2 fuel various services offered via LinkedIn's Marketing Solutions including Ad Targeting, Matched  
 3 Audiences, Audience Expansion, and LinkedIn Audience Network.<sup>11</sup>

4       21. Such information is extremely valuable to marketers and advertisers because the  
 5 inferences derived from users' personal information and communications allows marketers and  
 6 advertisers, including healthcare providers and insurance companies, to target potential  
 7 customers.<sup>12</sup>

8       22. For example, through the use of LinkedIn's Audience Network, marketers and  
 9 advertisers are able to expand their reach and advertise on sites other than LinkedIn to "reach  
 10 millions of professionals across multiple touchpoints."<sup>13</sup> According to Broc Munro of Microsoft,  
 11 "[w]e gravitate towards social platforms like LinkedIn to achieve more targeted marketing  
 12 engagement. However, we know that our audiences don't spend all their time on social media.  
 13 LinkedIn Audience Network enables us to expand our reach to trusted sites while still respecting  
 14 our audience targeting. This increases the impact of our advertising."<sup>14</sup>

15  
 16  
 17 behavior, engagement, interests, and more[,"] and "Reach the LinkedIn audience involved in the  
 18 buying decision").

19       <sup>11</sup> See *id.*

20       <sup>12</sup> LINKEDIN, PRIVACY POLICY, <https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy> ("We serve you  
 21 tailored ads both on and off our Services. We offer you choices regarding personalized ads, but you  
 22 cannot opt-out of seeing other ads."); LINKEDIN, ACCOUNT TARGETING,  
<https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions/ad-targeting> ("Target your ideal customer based  
 23 on traits like their job title, company name or industry, and by professional or personal interests");  
 24 LINKEDIN, EXAMPLES OF TRENDING AND BEST-IN-CLASS HEALTHCARE CAMPAIGNS AND CONTENT,  
 25 p.6, <https://business.linkedin.com/content/dam/me/business/en-us/marketing-solutions/healthcare-microsite/resources/lkin-lms-sales-healthcare-campaigns-trending-content-Jan2023.pdf> ("BD zeroed in on the end-benefit with a 30 second video introducing their PIVO needle-free blood  
 collection device to potential customers."); LINKEDIN, HEALTHCARE SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGIES FOR  
 2023, p.1, <https://business.linkedin.com/content/dam/me/business/en-us/marketing-solutions/healthcare-microsite/resources/hc-social-media-trends.pdf> (listing "potential customers" as "Common audiences" for insurance sector).

26       <sup>13</sup> LINKEDIN, ACCOUNT TARGETING, <https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions/ad-targeting>.

27       <sup>14</sup> LINKEDIN, LINKEDIN AUDIENCE NETWORK, <https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions/native-advertising/linkedin-audience-network>.

1       23. In July 2022, “LinkedIn Marketing Solutions surpassed \$5 billion in annual  
 2 revenue[.]”<sup>15</sup> That figure is “expected to further grow to reach 10.35 billion U.S. dollars by  
 3 2027.”<sup>16</sup>

4       24. According to LinkedIn, the LinkedIn Insight Tag is “[a] simple code snippet added  
 5 to [a] website [that] can help you optimize your campaigns, retarget your website visitors, and  
 6 learn more about your audiences.”<sup>17</sup> LinkedIn represents that the LinkedIn Insight Tag “enable[s]  
 7 in-depth campaign reporting and unlock[s] valuable insights about your website visitors.”<sup>18</sup>

8       25. LinkedIn’s current iteration of its Insight Tag is a JavaScript-based code which  
 9 allows for the installation of its software.<sup>19</sup> A critical feature allows the LinkedIn Insight Tag to  
 10 track users, even when third-party cookies are blocked.<sup>20</sup> LinkedIn “recommend[s] using the  
 11 JavaScript-based Insight Tag or Conversions API” because third-party cookie settings are being  
 12 deprecated across the industry.<sup>21</sup> Embedding the JavaScript as a first-party cookie causes users’  
 13 browsers to treat the LinkedIn Insight Tag as though it is offered by the website being visited,  
 14 rather than by LinkedIn. Doing so ensures that the third-party cookie-blocking functions of  
 15 modern web browsers do not prevent LinkedIn from collecting data through its software.<sup>22</sup> Instead,  
 16 the LinkedIn Insight Tag is shielded with the same privacy exemptions offered to first-party  
 17 cookies.

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 20       <sup>15</sup> *LinkedIn Business Highlights from Microsoft’s FY22 Q4 Earnings*, LINKEDIN PRESSROOM (July  
 21       25, 2022), <https://news.linkedin.com/2022/july/linkedin-business-highlights-from-microsoft-s-fy22-q4earnings#:~:text=And%20LinkedIn%20Marketing%20Solutions%20surpassed,revenue%20for%20the%20first%20time>.

22       <sup>16</sup> Dencheva, *supra* note 6.

23       <sup>17</sup> LINKEDIN, INSIGHT TAG, <https://business.linkedin.com/marketing-solutions/insight-tag>.

24       <sup>18</sup> LINKEDIN, LINKEDIN INSIGHT TAG FAQs, <https://www.linkedin.com/help/lms/answer/a427660>.

25       <sup>19</sup> LINKEDIN, *supra* note 17.

26       <sup>20</sup> *Id.* (“It’s important for advertisers to prepare for these changes by switching to JavaScript tags  
 27 and enabling ‘enhanced conversion tracking’ in the Insight Tag settings to continue capturing  
 28 signals where 3rd party cookies are blocked.”).

<sup>21</sup> *See id.*

<sup>22</sup> *See id.*

1       26. When a user who has signed in to LinkedIn (even if the user subsequently logs out)  
 2 is browsing a website where the LinkedIn Insight Tag has been embedded, an HTTP request is sent  
 3 using cookies, which includes information about the user's actions on the website.

4       27. These cookies also include data that differentiate users from one another and can be  
 5 used to link the data collected to the user's LinkedIn profile.

6       28. The HTTP request about an individual who has previously signed into LinkedIn  
 7 includes requests from the "li\_sugr" and "lms\_ads" cookies. Each of these cookies are used by  
 8 LinkedIn "to identify LinkedIn Members off LinkedIn" for advertising purposes.<sup>23</sup>

9       29. For example, the "li\_sugr" cookie is "[u]sed to make a probabilistic match of a  
 10 user's identity."<sup>24</sup> Similarly, the "lms\_ads" cookie is "[u]sed to identify LinkedIn Members off  
 11 LinkedIn for advertising."<sup>25</sup>

12      30. A LinkedIn profile contains information including an individual's first and last  
 13 name, place of work, contact information, and other personal details. Based on information it  
 14 obtains through the LinkedIn Insight Tag, Defendant LinkedIn is able to target its account holders  
 15 for advertising.

16      31. LinkedIn never receives consent from users to intercept and collect electronic  
 17 communications containing their sensitive and unlawfully disclosed information. In fact, LinkedIn  
 18 expressly warrants the opposite.

19      32. When first signing up, a user agrees to the User Agreement.<sup>26</sup> By using or  
 20 continuing to use LinkedIn's Services, users agree to two additional agreements: the Privacy  
 21 Policy<sup>27</sup> and the Cookie Policy.<sup>28</sup>

22  
 23  
 24     <sup>23</sup> LINKEDIN, LINKEDIN COOKIE TABLE, <https://www.linkedin.com/legal/l/cookie-table>.

25     <sup>24</sup> See id.

26     <sup>25</sup> See id.

27     <sup>26</sup> LINKEDIN, USER AGREEMENT, <https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement>.

28     <sup>27</sup> LINKEDIN, PRIVACY POLICY, <https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy>.

28     <sup>28</sup> LINKEDIN, COOKIE POLICY, <https://www.linkedin.com/legal/cookie-policy>.

1       33. LinkedIn's Privacy Policy begins by stating that "LinkedIn's mission is to connect  
 2 the world's professionals . . . . Central to this mission is our commitment to be transparent about  
 3 the data we collect about you, how it is used and with whom it is shared."<sup>29</sup>

4       34. The Privacy Policy goes on to describe what data LinkedIn collects from various  
 5 sources, including cookies and similar technologies.<sup>30</sup> LinkedIn states "we use cookies and similar  
 6 technologies (e.g., pixels and ad tags) to collect data (e.g., device IDs) to recognize you and your  
 7 device(s) on, off and across different services and devices where you have engaged with our  
 8 Services. We also allow some others to use cookies as described in our Cookie Policy."<sup>31</sup>

9       35. However, LinkedIn offers an express representation: "**We will only collect and  
 10 process personal data about you where we have lawful bases.**"<sup>32</sup>

11      36. Despite this explicit representation, LinkedIn intentionally intercepts and receives  
 12 sensitive and unlawfully disclosed information in violation of state and federal privacy laws.

13      37. Users never choose to provide sensitive information to LinkedIn because, among  
 14 other reasons, they never know whether a particular website uses the LinkedIn Insight Tag, and, if  
 15 so, what sensitive personal data it collects.

16      C. **How LinkedIn Intercepted Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
 17 Protected Health Information**

18      38. CityMD is a provider of accessible healthcare services that permits patients to  
 19 schedule appointments at their brick-and-mortar locations through its Website. Upon entering the  
 20 Website, CityMD warrants that it will help patients receive "care that can't wait."

21      39. To begin, patients browse available CityMD locations and select which location  
 22 they would like to book an appointment at. *See* Figure 1.

25      

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<sup>29</sup> LINKEDIN, PRIVACY POLICY, <https://www.linkedin.com/legal/privacy-policy>.

26      <sup>30</sup> *Id.*

27      <sup>31</sup> *Id.*

28      <sup>32</sup> *Id.* (emphasis added).



Figure 1: Screenshot of CityMD Website with pixel interceptions overlayed (confirmable with developer tools)

40. Unbeknownst to consumers, LinkedIn was tracking their activity the moment they entered the CityMD Website.

41. For example, the LinkedIn Insight Tag was embedded on the Website, which allowed LinkedIn to intercept and record “click” events. Click events detail information about which page on the Website the patient was viewing as well as the selections they were making. LinkedIn intercepts information including the patient’s appointment time, who the appointment was for, why they were booking the appointment, and their gender. See Figures 1–5.





Figure 2: Screenshot of CityMD Website with pixel interceptions overlayed (confirmable with developer tools)



**Figure 3:** Screenshot of CityMD Website with pixel interceptions overlayed (confirmable with developer tools)



**Figure 4:** Screenshot of CityMD Website with pixel interceptions overlayed (confirmable with developer tools)



42. Through the LinkedIn Insight Tag, Defendant intercepted consumers confidential information related to their medical appointments in order to monetize that data for targeted advertising.

43. As shown in Figures 2 through 5, LinkedIn intercepts several pieces of confidential information, including the location and time of their appointment, their gender, and the type of appointment they were seeking treatment for.

44. These interceptions also included the li\_sugr and lms\_ads cookies, which LinkedIn utilizes to identify its account holders for targeted advertising.

45. LinkedIn incorporated the information it intercepted from the CityMD Website into its marketing tools to fuel its targeted advertising service.

46. Plaintiff never consented, agreed, authorized, or otherwise permitted LinkedIn to intercept her confidential health information.

47. By law, Plaintiff is entitled to privacy in her protected health information and confidential communications. LinkedIn deprived Plaintiff of her privacy rights when it implemented a system that surreptitiously tracked and recorded Plaintiff's and other online

1 consumers' confidential communications, personally identifiable information, and protected health  
 2 information.

3       **D. LinkedIn's Conduct Violates Federal and State Privacy Laws**

4       48. Patient healthcare information is protected by federal law under the Health  
 5       Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") and its implementing regulations, which  
 6       are promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS").

7       49. Under federal law, PII, non-public medical information about a patient, potential  
 8       patient, or household member of a patient may not be disclosed without the patient's express  
 9       written authorization.<sup>33</sup>

10      50. Guidance from HHS provides that patient status alone is protected by HIPAA.

11      51. HIPAA's Privacy Rule defines "individually identifiable health information"  
 12      ("IIHI") as "a subset of health information, including demographic information collected from an  
 13      individual" that is (1) "created or received by a health care provider;" (2) "[r]elates to the past,  
 14      present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health  
 15      care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an  
 16      individual;" and either (i) "identifies the individual;" or (ii) "[w]ith respect to which there is a  
 17      reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual." 45 C.F.R. §  
 18      160.103.

19      52. The Privacy Rule broadly defines protected health information as IIHI that is  
 20      "transmitted by electronic media; maintained in electronic media; or transmitted or maintained in  
 21      any other form or medium." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.

22      53. Under the HIPAA de-identification rule, "health information is not individually  
 23      identifiable only if": (i) an expert "determines that the risk is very small that the information could  
 24      be used, alone or in combination with other reasonably available information, by an anticipated  
 25      recipient to identify an individual who is a subject of the information" and "documents the methods

26  
 27  
 28      <sup>33</sup> HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320; 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502; 164.508(a)(3), 164.514(b)(2)(i).

1       and results of the analysis that justify such determination” or (ii) “the following identifiers of the  
 2       individual or of relatives, employers, or household members of the individual are removed:

3       A. Names;

4       H. Medical record numbers;

5       J. Account numbers;

6       M. Device identifiers and serial numbers;

7       N. Web Universal Resource Locators (URLs);

8       O. Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; ... and

9       P. Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code... and” the covered entity must not “have actual knowledge that the information could be used alone or in combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the information.”<sup>34</sup>

10      54. Even the fact that an individual is receiving a medical service, i.e., is a patient of a particular entity, can be PHI. Guidance from HHS confirms as much:

11      Identifying information alone, such as personal names, residential addresses, or phone numbers, would not necessarily be designated as PHI. For instance, if such information was reported as part of a publicly accessible data source, such as a phone book, then this information would not be PHI because it is not related to health data. ... If such information was listed with health condition, healthcare provision or payment data, such as an indication that the individual was treated at a certain clinic, then this information would be PHI.<sup>35</sup>

12      55. HHS has previously instructed that patient status is protected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule:

13      (a) “The sale of a patient list to a marketing firm” is not permitted under

14      HIPAA. 65 Fed. Reg. 82717 (Dec. 28, 2000);

15      (b) “A covered entity must have the individual’s prior written authorization to use or disclose protected health information for marketing communications,”

25      <sup>34</sup> See 45 C.F.R. § 160.514.

26      <sup>35</sup> Office for Civil Rights, Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule at 5 (emphasis added) (Nov. 26, 2012), [https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/Deidentification/hhs\\_deid\\_guidance.pdf](https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/Deidentification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf).

which includes disclosure of mere patient status through a patient list. 67

Fed. Reg. 53186 (Aug. 14, 2002);

(c) It would be a HIPAA violation “if a covered entity impermissibly disclosed a list of patient names, addresses, and hospital identification numbers.” 78

Fed. Reg. 5642 (Jan. 25, 2013); and

(d) The only exception permitting a hospital to identify patient status without express written authorization is to "maintain a directory of individuals in its facility" that includes name, location, general condition, and religious affiliation when used or disclosed to "members of the clergy" or "other persons who ask for the individual by name." 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(1). Even then, patients must be provided an opportunity to object to the disclosure of the fact that they are a patient. 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(2).

56. HHS has issued numerous bulletins informing covered entities and their business associates that the use of online tracking technology, like the LinkedIn Insight Tag, can lead to violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.<sup>36</sup>

57. Tracking technology vendors like LinkedIn are considered business associates under HIPAA if they provide services to healthcare providers and receive or maintain PHI, like LinkedIn does:

Furthermore, tracking technology vendors are business associates if they create, receive, maintain, or transmit PHI on behalf of a regulated entity for a covered function (e.g. healthcare operations) or provide certain services to or for a covered entity (or another business associate) that involve the disclosure of PHI. In these circumstances, regulated entities must ensure that the disclosures made to such vendors are permitted by the Privacy Rule and enter into a business associate agreement (BAA) with these tracking technology vendors to ensure that PHI is protected in accordance with the HIPAA Rules. For example, if an individual makes an appointment through the website of a covered health clinic for health services and that website uses third party tracking technologies, then

<sup>36</sup> HHS.gov, HHS Office of Civil Rights Issue Bulletin on Requirements under HIPAA for Online Tracking Technologies to Protect the Privacy and Security of Health Information (Dec. 1, 2022), <https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2022/12/01/hhs-office-for-civil-rights-issues-bulletin-on-requirements-under-hipaa-for-online-tracking-technologies.html>.

1           the website might automatically transmit information regarding the  
 2           appointment and the individual's IP address to a tracking technology  
 3           vendor. In this case, the tracking technology vendor is a business  
associate and a BAA is required.

4       58.    HIPAA applies to healthcare providers' webpages with tracking technologies even  
 5           outside the patient portal:

6           Tracking on unauthenticated webpages

7           [T]racking technologies on unauthenticated webpages may have  
 8           access to PHI, in which case the HIPAA Rules apply to the regulated  
entities' use of tracking technologies and disclosures to tracking  
technology vendors. Examples of unauthenticated webpages where  
the HIPAA Rules apply include: The login page of a regulated  
entity's patient portal (which may be the website's homepage or a  
separate, dedicated login page), or a user registration webpage where  
an individual creates a login for the patient portal ... [and pages] that  
address[] specific symptoms or health conditions, such as pregnancy  
or miscarriage, or that permits individuals to search for doctors or  
schedule appointments without entering credentials may have access  
to PHI in certain circumstances. For example, tracking technologies  
could collect an individual's email address and/or IP address when  
the individual visits a regulated entity's webpage to search for  
available appointments with a healthcare provider. In this example,  
the regulated entity is disclosing PHI to the tracking technology  
vendor, and thus the HIPAA Rules apply.

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11       59.    And no PHI may be disclosed to tracking technology vendors, like LinkedIn, unless  
 12           the healthcare provider has properly notified its website users and entered into a business associate  
agreement with the vendor:

13           Regulated entities may identify the use of tracking technologies in  
 14           their website or mobile app's privacy policy, notice, or terms and  
conditions of use. However, the Privacy Rule does not permit  
disclosures of PHI to a tracking technology vendor based solely on a  
regulated entity informing individuals in its privacy policy, notice, or  
terms and conditions of use that it plans to make such disclosures.  
Regulated entities must ensure that all tracking technology vendors  
have signed a BAA and that there is an applicable permission prior to  
a disclosure of PHI.

15           If there is not an applicable Privacy Rule permission or if the vendor  
 16           is not a business associate of the regulated entity, then the  
individual's HIPAA-compliant authorizations are required before the  
PHI is disclosed to the vendor. Website banners that ask users to  
accept or reject a website's use of tracking technologies, such as  
cookies, do not constitute a valid HIPAA authorization.

1           If it is insufficient for a tracking technology vendor to agree to  
 2           remove PHI from the information it receives or de-identify the PHI  
 3           before the vendor saves the information. Any disclosure of PHI to the  
 4           vendor without individuals' authorizations requires the vendor to  
 5           have a signed BAA in place and requires that there is an applicable  
 6           Privacy Rule permission for disclosure.

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60.       An individual or corporation violates the HIPAA Privacy Rule if it knowingly: "(1)  
 6           uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier; [or] (2) obtains individually identifiable health  
 7           information relating to an individual." The statute states that a "person...shall be considered to  
 8           have obtained or disclosed individually identifiable health information...if the information is  
 9           maintained by a covered entity...and the individual obtained or disclosed such information without  
 10          authorization." 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6.

61.       The criminal and civil penalties imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 apply directly to  
 12          LinkedIn when it knowingly obtaining individually identifiable health information relating to an  
 13          individual, as those terms are defined under HIPAA.

62.       California state law is in accord.

63.       Plaintiff's and Class Members' information transmitted via the LinkedIn Insight Tag  
 16          was received in California.

64.       California has enacted several laws to protect patients' information. The California  
 18          Confidentiality of Medical Information Act requires healthcare providers to preserve the  
 19          confidentiality of patients' medical information and to obtain valid authorization before disclosing  
 20          a patient's medical information to a third party. Cal. Civ. Code § 56, *et seq.* The California  
 21          Consumer Privacy Protection Act requires businesses to disclose that they are obtaining medical  
 22          information for marketing purposes and obtain written consent. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.91(a)(2),  
 23          (c). The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 requires business to notify consumers when they  
 24          collect sensitive personal information, including medical information, and the purposes of the  
 25          collection and use of that information. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 *et seq.*

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65.       LinkedIn's conduct in this action violates each of these California laws or involves  
 27          LinkedIn's knowing participation with healthcare entities in violating these California laws.

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## **CLASS ALLEGATIONS**

66. **Class Definition:** Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of all LinkedIn account holders in the United States who booked a medical appointment on [www.citymd.com](http://www.citymd.com) (the “Class”).

67. Excluded from the Class is Defendant, the officers and directors of the Defendant at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns and any entity in which either Defendant have or had a controlling interest.

68. Plaintiff is a member of the Class she seeks to represent.

69. **Class Period:** The “Class Period” is the time period beginning on the date established by the Court’s determination of any applicable statute of limitations, after consideration of any tolling, concealment, and accrual issues, and ending on the date of entry of judgement.

70. Excluded from the Class are Defendant; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of Defendant; any entity in which Defendant has a controlling interest; any officer, director, or employee of Defendant; any successor or assign of Defendant; anyone employed by counsel in this action; any judge to whom this case is assigned, their spouse and immediate family members; and members of the judge's staff.

71. **Numerosity (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)):** Members of the putative Class are so numerous that their individual joinder herein is impracticable. Based on information and Plaintiff's belief, members of the putative Class number in the thousands. The precise number of putative Class Members and their identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery. Putative Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the distribution of Defendant's records.

**72. Commonality and Predominance (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), 23(b)(3)):** Common questions of law and fact exist as to all putative Class Members and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class Members. Common legal and factual questions include, but are not limited to:

(a) Whether LinkedIn's conduct violates the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.  
18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.:

- (b) Whether LinkedIn's conduct violates the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 630, *et seq.*;
- (c) Whether LinkedIn learned the contents of Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications with CityMD;
- (d) Whether LinkedIn used the information it learned from the contents of Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications with CityMD; and
- (e) Whether LinkedIn intentionally used an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop or record Plaintiff's and Class Members' confidential communications with CityMD without the Plaintiff's and Class Members' consent.

73. **Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)):** Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendant's wrongful conduct. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and all members of the Class have sustained economic injury arising out of Defendant's violations of statutory law as alleged herein.

74. **Adequacy (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)):** Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the putative Class Members she seeks to represent, she has retained counsel competent and experienced in prosecuting class actions, and she intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her counsel.

75. **Superiority (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)):** The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of Plaintiff and the putative members of the Class. Each individual Class Member may lack the resources to undergo the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex and extensive litigation necessary to establish Defendant's liability. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and multiplies the burden on the judicial system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of this case. Individualized litigation also presents potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. In contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a

single court on the issue of Defendant's liability. Class treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims are consistently adjudicated.

76. California law applies to the entirety of the Class. California's substantive laws  
4 apply to every member of the Class, regardless of where in the United States the Class member  
5 resides. Defendant's own User Agreement explicitly states that “[i]n the unlikely event we end up  
6 in a legal dispute . . . you and LinkedIn agree to resolve it in California courts using California  
7 law[.]”<sup>37</sup> By choosing California law for the resolution of disputes covered by its User  
8 Agreement, LinkedIn concedes that it is appropriate for this Court to apply California law to the  
9 instant dispute to all Class Members. Further, California's substantive laws may be  
10 constitutionally applied to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class Members under the Due Process  
11 Clause, see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. *See* U.S. Const. art.  
12 IV, § 1. California has significant contact, or significant aggregation of contacts, the claims  
13 asserted by the Plaintiff and all Class Members thereby creating state interests that ensure that the  
14 choice of California state law is not arbitrary or unfair. Defendant's decision to reside in California  
15 and avail itself of California's laws, and to engage in the challenged conduct from and emanating  
16 out of California, renders the application of California law to the claims herein constitutionally  
17 permissible. The application of California laws to the Class is also appropriate under California's  
18 choice of law rules because California has significant contacts to the claims of Plaintiff and the  
19 proposed Class and California has the greatest interest in applying its laws here.

20           77. Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing class allegations and definitions  
21 based on facts learned and legal developments following additional investigation, discovery, or  
22 otherwise.

**COUNT I**  
**Violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act**  
**28 U.S.C. § 2511.**

78. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein and brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against

<sup>37</sup> LINKEDIN, USER AGREEMENT, note 2.

1      Defendant.

2      79.    The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) prohibits the intentional  
 3    interception of the content of any electronic communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.

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4      80.    The ECPA protects both sending and receipt of communications.

5      81.    The ECPA provides a private right of action to any person whose electronic  
 6    communications are intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).

7      82.    LinkedIn intentionally intercepted electronic communications that Plaintiff and  
 8    Class Members exchanged with their healthcare provider through the LinkedIn Insight Tag  
 9    installed on the CityMD Website.

10     83.    The transmissions of data between Plaintiff and Class Members and their healthcare  
 11   provider (CityMD) qualify as communications under the ECPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).

12     84.    LinkedIn contemporaneously acquired Plaintiff’s and Class Members’  
 13   communications with CityMD.

14     85.    The intercepted communications include the contents of Plaintiff’s and Class  
 15   Members’ communications relating to appointments with CityMD.

16     86.    The following constitute “devices” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5):

17       (a)    The cookies LinkedIn used to track Plaintiff’s and Class Members’  
 18       communications;

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19       (b)    Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ browsers;  
 20       (c)    Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ computing devices;

21       (d)    LinkedIn’s web-servers;

22       (e)    The web-servers of CityMD where the LinkedIn Insight Tag is present; and

23       (f)    The LinkedIn Insight Tag source code LinkedIn deploys to acquire  
 24       Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ communications

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25     87.    LinkedIn is not a party to Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ communications with  
 26   CityMD.

1       88. LinkedIn receives the content of Plaintiffs' and Class members' communications  
2 through the surreptitious redirection of those communications from the Plaintiff's and Class  
3 members' computing devices.

4       89. Plaintiff and Class Members did not consent to LinkedIn's acquisition of their  
5 appointment communications with CityMD.

6       90. LinkedIn did not obtain legal authorization to obtain Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
7 communications with CityMD relating to communications with their health providers.

8       91. LinkedIn did not require CityMD to obtain the lawful rights to share the content of  
9 Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications relating to patient appointments.

10      92. Any purported consent that LinkedIn received from CityMD to obtain the content of  
11 Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications was not valid.

12      93. In acquiring the content of Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications relating  
13 to their appointments with CityMD, LinkedIn had a purpose that was tortious, criminal, and  
14 designed to violate state constitutional and statutory provisions including:

15       (a) The unauthorized acquisition of individually identifiable health information  
16 is tortious in and of itself regardless of whether the means deployed to  
17 acquire the information violates the Wiretap act or any subsequent purpose  
18 or use for the acquisition. LinkedIn intentionally committed a tortious act by  
19 acquiring individually identifiable health information without authorization  
20 to do so.

21       (b) The unauthorized acquisition of individually identifiable health information  
22 is a criminal violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 regardless of any subsequent  
23 purpose or use of the individually identifiable health information. LinkedIn  
24 intentionally violated 42 U.S.C. 1320d-6 by intentionally acquiring  
25 individually identifiable health information without authorization.

26       (c) A violation of HIPAA, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, which is a criminal  
27 offense punishable by fine or imprisonment with increased penalties where  
28 "the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually

1           identifiable health information for commercial advantage [or] personal  
 2           gain.” LinkedIn intentionally violated the enhanced penalty provision of 42  
 3           U.S.C. § 1320d-6 by acquiring the individually identifiable health  
 4           information “with intent to sell transfer or use” it for “commercial advantage  
 5           [or] personal gain.”

- 6           (d) A knowing intrusion upon Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ seclusion; and
- 7           (e) Violation of various state health privacy statutes, including but not limited to  
             the California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act; the California  
             Consumer Privacy Protection Act; and the California Consumer Privacy Act.

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94.       The federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, has four elements: (1) that the  
 10       defendant voluntarily and intentionally devised a scheme to defraud another out of money or  
 11       property; (2) that the defendant did so with the intent to defraud; (3) that it was reasonably  
 12       foreseeable that interstate wire communications would be used; and (4) that interstate wire  
 13       communications were in fact used. The attempt version of the wire fraud statute provides that  
 14       “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject  
 15       to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object  
 16       of the attempt or conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C. § 1349.

95.       LinkedIn’s scheme or artifice to defraud in this action consists of the false and  
 10       misleading statements and omissions in its User Agreement and the placement of LinkedIn’s  
 11       JavaScript based code disguising the LinkedIn Insight Tag as a first-party cookie of the patients’  
 12       healthcare provider (CityMD) rather than a third party cookie from LinkedIn.

96.       The “property” involved consists of Plaintiff’s and Class Members property rights  
 10       to the confidentiality of their individually identifiable health information and their right to  
 11       determine whether such information remains confidential and exclusive right to determine who  
 12       may collect and/or use such information for marketing purposes and the property rights to  
 13       determine who has access to their computing devices.

97.       LinkedIn acted with the intent to defraud in that it willfully invaded and took  
 10       Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ property rights (a) to the confidentiality of their individually

identifiable health information and their right to determine whether such information remains confidential and exclusive right to determine who may collect and/or use such information for marketing purposes and (b) to determine who has access to their computing devices.

98. It was reasonably foreseeable to LinkedIn that its scheme and artifice to defraud would involve interstate wire communications and, in fact, interstate wire communications were used in the carrying out of LinkedIn's scheme and artifice to defraud.

99. Courts around the country have uniformly held that a healthcare provider's use of online tracking technology, like the LinkedIn Insight Tag, on its website without patient authorization is actionable in tort or contract or a statutory violation. See *Doe v. Mercy Health*, Case No. A 2002633 (Hamilton County, Ohio); *Doe v. Partners*, Case No. 1984-CV-01651 (Suffolk County, Massachusetts); *Doe v. Sutter Health*, Case No. 34-2019-00258072-CU-BT-GD (Sacramento County, California); *Doe v. University Hospitals*, Case No. CV-20-9333357 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio); *Doe v. Sutter Health*, Case No. 34-2019-00258072-CU-BT-GDS (Sacramento County, California).

100. As a result of Defendant's violation of the ECPA, Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to all damages available under 18 U.S.C. § 2520, including statutory damages of whichever is the greater of \$100 a day for each day of violation or \$10,000, equitable or declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs.

**COUNT II**  
**Violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act**  
**Cal. Penal Code § 631**

101. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein and brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against Defendant.

102. The California Invasion of Privacy Act (the “CIPA”) is codified at California Penal Code Sections 630 to 638. The CIPA begins with its statement of purpose—namely, that the purpose of the CIPA is to “protect the right of privacy of the people of [California]” from the threat posed by “advances in science and technology [that] have led to the development of new devices

1 and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications . . .” Cal. Penal  
 2 Code § 630.

3 103. A person violates California Penal Code Section 631(a), if:

4 by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner, [s/he]  
 5 intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether physically,  
 6 electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone  
 7 wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or instrument of any  
 8 internal telephonic communication system, or [s/he] willfully and without the consent  
 9 of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads, or attempts  
 10 to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication  
 while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent  
 from, or received at any place within this state; or [s/he] uses, or attempts to use, in  
 any manner, or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so  
 obtained . . .<sup>38</sup>

11 104. To avoid liability under section 631(a), a defendant must show it had the consent of  
 12 *all* parties to a communication.

13 105. At all relevant times, LinkedIn tracked and intercepted Plaintiff's and Class  
 14 Members' internet communications while using www.citymd.com to book a medical appointment.  
 15 These communications were intercepted without the authorization and consent of Plaintiff and  
 16 Class Members.

17 106. Through these interceptions, LinkedIn intended to learn some meaning of the  
 18 content the visitors requested.

19 107. The following items constitute “machine[s], instrument[s], or contrivance[s]” under  
 20 the CIPA, and even if they do not, the LinkedIn Insight Tag fall under the broad catch-all category  
 21 of “any other manner”:

- 22     a.     The computer codes and programs LinkedIn used to track Plaintiff and Class  
        23             Members' communications while they were navigating www.citymd.com;
- 24     b.     Plaintiff's and Class Members' browsers;
- 25     c.     Plaintiff's and Class Members' computing and mobile devices;
- 26     d.     LinkedIn's web and ad servers;

27  
 28 <sup>38</sup> Cal. Penal Code § 631(a).

- 1       e. The web and ad servers from which LinkedIn tracked and intercepted Plaintiff's and  
2       Class Members' communications while they were using a web browser to access or  
3       navigate www.citymd.com;  
4       f. The computer codes and programs used by LinkedIn to effectuate its tracking and  
5       interception of Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications while they were  
6       using a browser to visit www.citymd.com; and  
7       g. The plan LinkedIn carried out to effectuate its tracking and interception of  
8       Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications while they were using a web  
9       browser or mobile device to visit www.citymd.com.

10      108. At all relevant times, LinkedIn, though the LinkedIn Insight Tag, intentionally  
11     tapped or made unauthorized connections with the lines of internet communications between  
12     Plaintiff and Class Members and the CityMD Website without the consent of all parties to the  
13     communication.

14      109. LinkedIn, willfully and without the consent of Plaintiff and Class Members, read or  
15     attempted to read, or learn the contents or meaning of Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
16     communications to CityMD while the communications are in transit or passing over any wire, line  
17     or able, or were being received at any place within California when it intercepted Plaintiff's and  
18     Class Members' communications and data with CityMD.

19      110. LinkedIn used or attempted to use the communications and information they  
20     received through their tracking technology, including to supply advertising services.

21      111. The patient communication information intercepted through the LinkedIn Insight  
22     Tag, such as information related to medical appointments, constituted protected health information.

23      112. As a result of the above violations, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and other Class  
24     Members in the amount of \$5,000 dollars per violation or three times the amount of actual  
25     damages, whichever is greater. Additionally, California Penal Code Section 637.2 specifically  
26     states that “[it] is not a necessary prerequisite to an action pursuant to this section that the plaintiff  
27     has suffered, or be threatened with, actual damages.”

1           113. Under the CIPA, Defendant is also liable for reasonable attorney's fees, and other  
2 litigation costs, injunctive and declaratory relief, and punitive damages in an amount to be  
3 determined by a jury, but sufficient to prevent the same or similar conduct by Defendant in the  
4 future.

**COUNT III**  
**Violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act**  
**Cal. Penal Code § 632**

7           114. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set  
8 forth herein and brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against  
9 Defendant.

10       115. Cal. Penal Code § 632 prohibits “intentionally and without the consent of all parties  
11 to a confidential communication,” the “use[] [of] an electronic amplifying or recording device to  
12 eavesdrop upon or record the confidential communication.”

13           116. Section 632 defines “confidential communication” as “any communication carried  
14 on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be  
15 confined to the parties thereto[.]”

16           117. Plaintiff's and Class Members' communications to CityMD, including their  
17 sensitive personal and health information, such as why they are booking appointments, were  
18 confidential communications for purposes of § 632, because Plaintiff and Class Members had an  
19 objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in this data.

20       118. Plaintiff and Class Members expected their communications to CityMD to be  
21 confined to CityMD in part, due to the protected nature of the health information at issue. Plaintiff  
22 and Class Members did not expect third parties, like LinkedIn, to secretly eavesdrop upon or record  
23 this confidential information and their communications.

24           119. LinkedIn's tracking technology, i.e., the LinkedIn Insight Tag, are all electronic  
25 amplifying or recording devices for purposes of § 632.

26 120. By contemporaneously intercepting and recording Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
27 confidential communications to CityMD through this technology, LinkedIn eavesdropped and/or

1 recorded confidential communications through an electronic amplifying or recording device in  
2 violation of § 632 of CIPA.

3           121. At no time did Plaintiff or Class Members consent to LinkedIn's conduct, nor could  
4 they reasonably expect that their communications to CityMD would be overheard or recorded by  
5 LinkedIn.

6           122. LinkedIn utilized Plaintiff's and Class Members' sensitive personal and health  
7 information for its own purposes, including for targeted advertising.

8           123. Plaintiff and Class Members seek statutory damages in accordance with § 637.2(a)  
9 which provides for the greater of: (1) \$5,000 per violation; or (2) three times the amount of  
10 damages sustained by Plaintiff and the Class in an amount to be proven at trial, as well as  
11 injunctive or other equitable relief.

12           124. Plaintiff and Class Members have also suffered irreparable injury from these  
13 unauthorized acts. Plaintiff's and Class Members' sensitive data has been collected, viewed,  
14 accessed, stored, by LinkedIn, have not been destroyed, and due to the continuing threat of such  
15 injury, have no adequate remedy at law. Plaintiff and Class Members are accordingly entitled to  
16 injunctive relief.

## COUNT IV

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18           125. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as if fully set  
19 forth herein and brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the Class against  
20 Defendant.

21       126. Plaintiff and Class Members have an interest in: (1) precluding the dissemination  
22 and/or misuse of their sensitive, confidential communications and protected health information;  
23 and (2) making personal decisions and/or conducting personal activities without observation,  
24 intrusion, or interference, including, but not limited to, the right to visit and interact with various  
25 internet sites without being subjected to wiretaps without Plaintiff's and Class Members'  
26 knowledge or consent.

1           127. At all relevant times, by using the LinkedIn Insight Tag to record and communicate  
2 patients' personal identifiers alongside their confidential medical communications, Defendant  
3 intentionally invaded Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy rights under the California  
4 Constitution.

5 Plaintiff and Class Members had a reasonable expectation that their  
6 communications, identities, health information, and other data would remain confidential, and that  
7 Defendant would not intercept such information communicated on www.citymd.com.

8           129. Plaintiff and Class Members did not authorize Defendant to record and transmit  
9 Plaintiff's and Class Members' private medical communications alongside their personally  
10 identifiable and health information.

11           130. This invasion of privacy was serious in nature, scope, and impact because it related  
12 to patients' private medical communications. Moreover, it constituted an egregious breach of  
13 societal norms underlying the privacy right.

14           131. Accordingly, Plaintiff and Class Members seek all relief available for invasion of  
15 privacy under the California Constitution.

## **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

**WHEREFORE**, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment, as follows:

- (a) For a determination that this action is a proper class action;
  - (b) For an order certifying the Class, naming Plaintiff as representative of the Class, and naming Plaintiff's attorneys as Class Counsel to represent the Class;
  - (c) For an order declaring that Defendant's conduct violated the statutes referenced herein;
  - (d) For an order finding in favor of Plaintiff and the Class on all counts asserted herein;
  - (e) For an award of compensatory damages, including statutory damages where available, to Plaintiff and the Class Members against Defendant for all damages sustained as a result of Defendant's wrongdoing, in an amount to be proven at trial;
  - (f) For punitive damages, as warranted, in an amount to be determined at trial;
  - (g) For an order requiring Defendant to disgorge revenues and profits wrongfully

obtained;

- (h) For prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded;
  - (i) For injunctive relief as pleaded or as the Court may deem proper;
  - (j) For an order awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses and costs of suit; and
  - (k) For an order granting Plaintiff and Class Members such further relief as the Court deems appropriate.

**JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and the proposed Class, demands a trial by jury for all of the claims asserted in this Complaint so triable.

Dated: February 12, 2025.

Respectfully submitted,

**Deleted:** February 12, 2025February 11, 2025

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.

By: /s/ Sarah N. Westcot  
Sarah N. Westcot

Sarah N. Westcot (State Bar No. 264916)  
701 Brickell Ave., Suite 2100  
Miami, FL 33131-2800  
Telephone: (305) 330-5512  
Facsimile: (305) 676-9006  
Email: [swestcot@busror.com](mailto:swestcot@busror.com)

*Counsel for Plaintiff*